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Background: Demand side financing (DSF) is a widely employed strategy to enhance utilization of healthcare. The
impact of DSF on health care seeking in general and that of maternal care in particular is already known. Yet, its
effect on financial access to care, out-of-pocket spending (OOPS) and provider motivations is not considerably
established. Without such evidence, DSFs may not be recommendable to build up any sustainable healthcare
delivery approach. This study explores the above aspects on India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) program.
Methods: This study employed design and was conducted in three districts of Orissa, selected through a
three-stage stratified sampling. The quantitative method was used to review the Health Management Information
System (HMIS). The qualitative methods included focus groups discussions with beneficiaries (n = 19) and
community intermediaries (n = 9), and interviews (n = 7) with Ministry of Health officials. HMIS data enabled to
review maternal healthcare utilization. Group discussions and interviews explored the perceived impact of JSY on
in-facility delivery, OOPS, healthcare costs, quality of care and performance motivation of community health
workers.
Results: The number of institutional deliveries, ante-and post-natal care visits increased after the introduction of JSY
with an annual net growth of 18.1%, 3.6% and 5% respectively. The financial incentive provided partial financial
risk-protection as it could cover only 25.5% of the maternal healthcare cost of the beneficiaries in rural areas and
14.3% in urban areas. The incentive induced fresh out-of-pocket spending for some mothers and it could not
address maternal care requirements comprehensively. An activity-based community worker model was encouraging
to augment maternal healthcare consumption. However, the existing level of financial incentives and systemic
support were inadequate to motivate the volunteers optimally on their performance.
Conclusion: Demand side financial incentive could enhance financial access to maternal healthcare. However, it
did not adequately protect households from financial risks. An effective integration of JSY with similar social
protection or financial risk-protection measures may protect mothers substantially from potential out-of-pocket
spending. Further, this integrated approach may help upholding more awareness on maternal health rights and
entitlements. It can also address maternal health beyond ‘maternal healthcare’ and ensure sustainability through
pooled financial and non-financial resources.
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Demand side financial incentive (DSF) is a form of
subsidy and it directly provides purchasing ability to
consumers on certain publicly provided goods such
as health and nutrition [1]. DSF introduces two key
changes in the public financing of such goods and
services [1]. First, it entitles the government to be a
supplier of purchasing power to consumers instead
of being a direct service provider. Secondly, it tunes fi-
nancing as ‘output-based’ than ‘input-based’ and hence
links the subsidy or its objective with the beneficiary.
DSF’s importance primarily lies on its scope to integrate
various human development approaches and advance in-
dividual and societal capabilities. Under DSF, overall
human development occurs as it addresses populations’
social, environmental and economic risks or vulnerabil-
ities [2].
In health sector, DSF has a possible role in the delivery
of certain sub-optimally and inequitably consumed services
(e.g. maternal care) and betterment of unmet health
behaviors [3–5]. DSF operates on the principal-agent the-
ory, where the principal (government, donor or commu-
nity) transfers funds to an agent (consumer) conditional on
a defined action [6]. Primarily it caters to under-
served areas, populations and services [6]. Its underlying
principle is to synergize the supply-and demand-sides
through additional demand generation and supply
strengthening [4,7]. Thus, DSF links various supply-
and demand-side measures (e.g. service provision and
community awareness) with differential financing
approach [3,7]. It also harnesses the private sector
potential and promotes innovative pooling and trans-
fer of funds. As of now, among the various health needs,
DSF has predominantly focused on millennium develop-
ment goals (MDG) [7].
Demand side financial incentives for maternal healthcare:
What is already known?
In many regions and countries (e.g. Latin America, India,
Nepal and Bangladesh) the earliest public sector DSF initia-
tives catered to maternal and child health (MCH) [8–10].
This MCH focus was due to such countries’ persistent need
to meet MDGs 4 and 5. Among the variants of DSF,
vouchers and conditional cash transfers are more wide-
spread on MCH compared to health insurance. This is
because the former appear to be better streamlined to
achieve specified outcomes in a given timeframe [2,3,10].
DSF’s design, roll-out and monitoring vary across countries.
For instance, the Indian DSF initiatives exhibit less conver-
gence of maternal care with reproductive health services,
unlike those many Latin American and African countries.
DSF’s impact on intermediate outcomes such as
skilled birth attendance and consumer awareness are con-
siderably documented, though their long-term benefits onmaternal health status are awaited [4]. However, the evi-
dence on their contribution to out-of-pocket spending
(OOPS) and performance motivation of providers is scanty.
Although, they target purchasing power provision to reduce
OOPS, the prime focus on achieving the specified health
targets derail them from addressing OOPS largely [4]. This
may ultimately concern the fulfillment of MDG 1 (i.e. pov-
erty reduction) in many countries, even if they are able to
achieve other health related MDGs. Further, without under-
standing the intricacies of OOPS vis-à-vis DSF, healthcare
delivery may not be appropriately organized under DSF.
The optimal packaging of incentives for rational consumer
choices may not be reasonable without understanding the
scope of OOPS under DSF. Many resource constraint set-
tings introduced DSF to enhance skilled birth attendance
with the intermediation of community health workers [4].
Without ensuring their performance motivation, the
achievement of specific community response and effective-
ness of the financial resources employed may not be
feasible.
The present study on Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) pro-
gram in India explored the following; 1) JSY’s potential to
enhance women’s financial access to maternal healthcare,
2) its effect on household out-of-pocket spending (OOPS)
on maternal healthcare, and 3) its influence on community
health workers’ performance motivation.
Methods
Janani Suraksha Yojana: an overview
JSY is a federal government funded nation-wide scheme
offering conditional cash transfers for safe motherhood
since 2005 [11,12]. JSY was initiated in the milieu of India’s
persistently alarming maternal and infant deaths [11–13].
Paid in bank cheques after child birth, the incentive is con-
ditional upon either in-facility delivery or skilled birth at-
tendance [14,15]. Women are encouraged to avail free
ante- and post-natal care in public facilities, but no incen-
tive is linked to such care [14,15].
JSY holds different conditions for low-and high-per-
forming states, a classification by Government of India
(GOI) based on basic demographic and health indicators
[14,15].
In low-performing states like Orissa, women of all socio-
economic and demographic profiles are covered, irrespect-
ive of the order of their child birth [14,15]. Upon in-facility
delivery, each pregnant woman receives US$ 30.10 in rural
areas and US$ 21.50 in urban areas [16]. The incentive for
home delivery is US$ 10.75. The community health worker
(known as Accredited Social Health Activist or ASHA)
receives US$ 7.50 per pregnant woman in rural areas (US$
4.30 in urban areas) for coordinating ante-and post-natal
care and escorting for in-facility delivery. An additional sum
of (ANC and PNC) US$ 5.30 is also packaged with ASHA
incentives to cover transport costs of mothers. In high-
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backward women and each eligible woman receives US$
15.05 and 12.90 in rural and urban areas respectively [16].
The state governments manage the scheme and empanel
healthcare providers, including the private ones, who fulfill
certain eligibility criteria [15,17]. JSY’s annual financial allo-
cation increased from US$ 8.2 million to US$ 266.8 million
between 2005–06 and 2008–09. The number of beneficiar-
ies increased from 0.73 million to 843 million, covering a
third of the 26 million child births annually in India during
the same period. For the same period, the operational cost
per beneficiary had amplified from US$11.24 to US$ 31.65
[17].
Study setting and sampling
The study was performed in Orissa, a socio-economically
backward state with 85% rural, 40% poor and 22% in-
digenous population [18]. Maternal mortality ratio in
Orissa is 540 per 100,000 live births (national average 301)
and 39% of deliveries are institutional (national average
40.7%) [18]. The study settings were selected through a
three-stage stratified random sampling. In the first stage,
Orissa was selected among low-performing states. In the
second stage, the districts of Gajapati, Nayagarh, and
Mayurbhanj were chosen representing the administrative
division of the state. Finally, a half of the rural and urban
blocks from each district were included in the study,
which together had 10% of Orissa’s population.
Data collection
This study employed a ‘mixed-methods design’ and was
carried out in the first half of 2010. The quantitative
method was employed to review the Health Manage-
ment Information System (HMIS) data. The qualitative
methods consisted of focus group discussions (FGDs)
with mothers (JSY beneficiaries) and ASHAs (JSY inter-
mediaries). Further, there were key-informant interviews
with the Ministry of Health (MoH) officials (JSY and
healthcare providers). The study also reviewed some re-
ports and policy pronouncements to validate the data
gathered from HMIS, FGDs and interviews. The benefi-
ciaries were identified with the help of ASHAs, women’s
groups and other community-based entities. The
ASHAs were identified through the local MoH program
officers.
Review of documents and data sources
The indicators on maternal healthcare consumption
(i.e. institutional deliveries, ANC and PNC) and out-
comes (maternal deaths) from HMIS were compared
before (2002–2004) and during the implementation
(2005–2010) of JSY in the state. The review of other
documents mentioned earlier helped to triangulate the
study outcomes.FGDs
Nineteen FGDs were conducted among 141 beneficia-
ries of JSY during the six months preceding the study.
There were nine FGDs for 78 ASHAs. Discussions with
mothers explored their understanding of JSY and its im-
pact on rationalizing maternal healthcare choice, their
approach towards skilled birth attendance, maternal
healthcare seeking, OOPS and financial risk-protection.
Discussions with ASHAs provided the information on
their understanding of JSY, payment mechanisms, per-
formance motivations, challenges on effective functioning
of JSY and adequacy of financial risk-protection for
mothers.Key informant interviews
Seven state, district and sub-district level MoH offi-
cials were interviewed on the functioning of JSY, chal-
lenges on its effective functioning and adequacy of
financial risk-protection for mothers and financial in-
centives for ASHAs. The selected MoH officials were
responsible for planning, implementation and moni-
toring of maternal and child health programs in the state.Data analysis
Verbal informed consent was obtained from each re-
spondent after describing the study objectives and the
use of forthcoming information. There was no refusal
or withdrawal from any of the participants approa-
ched for the study. Information was collected by
locally-based researchers through pre-tested and semi-
structured guides in the local language Odia. The group
discussions and interviews lasted between 30 and
45 minutes. Responses were audio-recorded, transcribed
verbatim and translated to English. Data collection, co-
ding and translation were supervised by two graduate
researchers.
Emerging themes among the responses were coded,
collated and analyzed by the first author to generate
higher order generalizations through NVivo software.
The thematic analysis of the responses was based on six
categories; influence of JSY on the place of delivery; JSY’s
impact on OOPs; maternal healthcare seeking; perfor-
mance motivations of ASHAs; determinants and out-
comes of maternal healthcare cost; and the need to link
JSY with other financial risk -protection measures. The
data on maternal healthcare utilization from HMIS were
entered into Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and its trends
were analyzed in STATA software. Ethical approval was
obtained from an Independent Ethics Committee in
Bhubaneswar. It consisted of stakeholders from the
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, academia, civil
society organizations and the community.
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Trend of institutional deliveries vis-à-vis JSY benefits in
Orissa
During the JSY period (2005–2010), there has been a
considerable improvement in maternal healthcare uti-
lization (Table 1). The number of institutional deliveries
grew at 20.3% annually (255,323 to 514,792). The num-
ber of pregnant women receiving ANC and PNC in-
creased respectively at 8.4% (350,982 to 452,980) and
5.9% (241,980 to 313,456). During the pre-JSY period
(2002–2004), institutional deliveries, ANC and PNC grew
at 2.2% (149,341 to159,126), 4.8% (226,489 to259,376) and
0.9% (111, 257 to 241,980) respectively. Thus, JSY’s pos-
sible positive net contribution to the spread of institu-
tional deliveries, ANC and PNC was 18.1%, 3.6% and 5.0%
respectively (without controlling for other contributing
factors). The proportion of deliveries receiving JSY bene-
fits increased from 3.7% (26,407) in 2005–06 to 87.3%
(587,158) in 2009–10. About 12% (70,458 out of 587,158)
of JSY beneficiaries had domiciliary childbirth in 2010.
The C-section rate among the JSY beneficiaries was 3.8%
(22,312). The proportionate increment in ANC and PNC
were lesser than that of institutional deliveries during the
JSY period (Figure 1).
Experience and perceptions on JSY
About the JSY beneficiaries
Among the 141 discussant mothers, about a half did
not have any formal education and 59.7%, (n = 84) were
below the poverty line. There were 65.3% (n = 92) from
socially backward communities and 36.3% (n = 51) in
15–23 age group. Some had first time child birth (23.9%,
n = 33), while 44% (n= 62) and 32% (n= 45) were second-
and third -time mothers respectively. Around 9% (n= 14)
were second-time JSY beneficiaries, 10% (n= 14) had
domiciliary child birth and none had adverse birth out-
comes. There were 40% (25 out of 62) and 38% (17 out of
45) of second-time and third-time mothers respectively,
who had institutional delivery without JSY benefits for theTable 1 Key maternal healthcare indicators pre- and during J






2002-03 811,104 Not applicable 149,341(18.4) 226,489 (27.9)
2003-04 789,215 Not applicable 142,825(18.9) 243,125 (30.8)
2004-05 743,711 Not applicable 159,126 (21.3) 259,376 (35.1)
2005-06 709,829 26,407 (1.9) 255,323 (36.0) 350,982 (49.5)
2006-07 772,736 227,204 (29.4) 357661 (46.3) 378,902 (49.0)
2007-08 701,215 490,657 (70.0) 440,234 (62.8) 401,196 (57.2)
2008-09 711,501 506,879 (71.2) 504,823 (71.0) 412,910 (58.0)
2009-10 672,585 587,158 (87.3) 514,792 (76.5) 452,980 (67.3)
Source: Health Management Information System Government of Orissa.
* Figures in parentheses are percentages to total number of deliveries.previous childbirth. Key background characteristics of
mothers, ASHAs and MoH officials are given in Table 2.
Influence of JSY on the place of delivery
According to the discussant mothers (93%) financial in-
centives motivated them and their households to opt
for institutional deliveries. Both ASHAs (98%) and MoH
(96%) officials also acknowledged JSY’s potential to in-
duce institutional deliveries. One-third of the mothers
would have delivered at home in the absence of financial
incentives. However, young, literate and first-time mothers
would have still had in-facility delivery, particularly at
government health centers, even without the incentives.
This preference was due to better facilities in accredited
health centers and the current non-availability of birth
attendants in the community. Preference for institu-
tional delivery was the least among those aged above
25 years and staying far away from secondary level
hospitals. While validating these revelations from the
secondary sources, we found that there is an increas-
ing trend for skilled birth attendance in the state
[18]. Further, being far away from secondary hospitals
reduce the probability of in-facility delivery [19].
I went to a government hospital for delivery as ASHA
didi (sister) told me about the JSY incentives.
[Mother, Nayagarh]
Many mothers had hospitalized delivery due to JSY
[ASHA, Mayurbhanj]
I feel a drastic improvement in institutionalized delivery
with JSY program [Medical Officer, Mayurbhanj]
Impact on out-of-pocket spending (OOPS)
Many mothers (96%) were concerned about them incur-
ring huge OOPS on maternal care. The average cost of
pregnancy and delivery care in rural Orissa was about
US$ 110 (US$ 70 in urban areas). The JSY incentive was
able to cover only 25.5% (14.3% in urban areas) of this




(per 1000 live births)
Maternal mortality
ratio(per 100000 live births)
111, 257 (13.7) 97 354
113, 242 (14.3) 83 358
114,231 (15.4) 77 351
241,980 (34.1) 75 348
265,324 (37.4) 71 341
283,556 (40.4) 62 335
299,891 (42.2) 57 321
313,456 (46.6) 53 303
Figure 1 Maternal healthcare trend in Orissa before and during JSY.
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approached pregnancy as a family event and mobilized
resources on behalf of the women. Some women them-
selves looked for resources to finance their cost of
child birth. Since the cost often exceeded the house-
holds’ ability-to-pay, they covered it through some distress
coping measures such as unorganized loans and sale of
hard-earned assets. Since the JSY incentive was received
after the delivery, it could not prevent the need for raising
short-term loans. After receiving the reimbursement, they
were able to pay back at least a portion of their loans. A
household survey in the state also observed that around
25% of households mobilized resources for maternal care
through hardship means [20].Table 2 Background characteristics of the study participants
Characteristics No of participants Mean age (range)
Focus group discussions
Mothers groups (n = 17) 141 24(15–35)
ASHA’s groups (n = 11) 78 32(25–40)
Key-informant interviews
MoH officials 07 33(24–51)I spent at least one year’s household income on
pregnancy care. [Mother, Gajapati]
Our major constraint is that we do not have liquid
cash with us when we need. [Mother, Nayagarh]
A comparison of OOPS demonstrates that it was higher
for institutional deliveries supported by JSY than domici-
liary deliveries and non-JSY supported institutional deli-
veries (Figure 2). For instance, OOPS for mothers with
domiciliary delivery was US$32 and US$29 in rural and
urban areas respectively. It was US$35 for some rural
mothers (US$ 29 in urban areas) for their previous institu-
tionalized child birth during the last two years without







































JSY’s Contribution (USD) OOPs (USD)
Figure 2 Share of JSY and out-of-pocket expenditure (OOP) in total cost of maternal healthcare.
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and outcomes
A decomposition of the reported cost highlights that
around 45% (US$45.5/110 in rural and US$30/70 in
urban areas) was incurred during the ANC period and
the rest during the delivery. A few had to spend 5% of
their total cost on PNC. Even though the public health-
care system provided free ANC and PNC, women largely
incurred OOPS in this regard. Some public providers
directed many women to purchase vitamin syrups from
private pharmacies. They also prescribed vitamin syrups
(some upon demand by mothers), each costing US$ 3–5.
The reported cost of care was 12.3% higher in private
institutions (ANC 8.1%, delivery 4.2%) than in public
institutions. The largest cost difference was observed on
diagnosis (12% to 18%) followed by consultation fee
(11.1% to 16%). Other sources also indicated that the
cost of care on maternal care in Orissa was more in the
private sector (Rs.3487), than that of the public sector
(Rs.1494) [13].
I went to the private clinic for ANC and it costed me
around half of my total pregnancy related expenses.
[Mother, Mayurbhanj]
My ANC was in a public hospital, but I purchased
vitamin syrups costing more than Rs.120 (US$2.58)
from a medicine store upon my request.
[Mother, Gajapati]
Another dimension of OOPS was on medicines and
supplies during the time of delivery in public hospi-
tals. The MoH officials were concerned about these
additional expenses, though they expressed helpless-
ness to overcome such system constraints. Some women
expressed the inevitability to spend on transportation
and it was more than what they received as incentive.These huge transport costs occurred in order to com-
mute to an accredited facility despite the availability
of facilities nearby. In the absence of incentives, women
would have preferred to go to those non-accredited
hospitals as they had faith on the providers over there.
Many women have to spend on sutures, antibiotics etc.
But, we are not able to do anything to overcome this.
[Medical Officer, Mayurbhanj]
I spent Rs.300 (US$6.45) on a truck to go to the
hospital where JSY benefits were available and it
was more than what I have received.
[Mother, Gajapati]
About 40% of the JSY incentive was given back to the
providers as ‘informal payments’, particularly in, but
not limited to the public sector. Some mothers were
concerned about ASHAs asking for incentives without
providing sufficient support. In short, the financial in-
centives could not prevent irrational prescription prac-
tices, OOPS on supplies during delivery, and informal
payments.
Some providers at the primary health center behaved
as if I was accepting their mercy and they were giving
me some benefits through JSY incentives. [Mother,
Mayurbhanj]
I paid more this time to the primary health center
staff than my first delivery, when I did not receive JSY
benefits. [Mother, Gajapati]
ASHA didi told me to report that she had escorted me
to the hospital. But I was surprised, because she did
not do so. [Mother, Mayurbhanj]
ASHA didi asked me a share on transportation
reimbursement, though what I received was lesser than
my actual spending. [Mother, Nayagarh]
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consumption and health seeking
The majority of women (irrespective of age and education)
were not aware of the appropriate maternal healthcare
requirements. They preferred institutional delivery or skilled
birth attendance to comprehensive maternal healthcare.
Only 23% (32 out of 141) had at least two ANC and
PNC visits. Among the domiciliary deliveries with JSY
benefits, three-fourth received at least one ANC. Women
did not perceive maternal care or its entitlement as a right
nor had adequate awareness on the whole objectives of
JSY. Though public institutions catered to over 75%
(95 out of 127) of the institutional deliveries, private
institutions serviced over 65% (94 out of 141) of ANC.
Women did not differentiate the quality of care they
received between the public and private hospitals as
both had different merits and demerits of their own.
They were more appreciative of the staff behavior and
the status of supplies at the private hospitals. On the
contrary, they felt the infrastructure status and drug
efficacy to be the same in both the sectors.
I think JSY aims at hospitalized delivery, as it is
safer, if any complication arises during delivery.
[Mother, Nayagarh]
I only prefer ante natal care as the child will not have
any complications even if post natal care is omitted.
[Mother, Mayurbhanj]
I did not have post natal care, as the chances of
complications were less after delivery.
[Mother, Gajapati]
I am happy that the Government at least gives us an
opportunity to have institutionalized delivery. So, we
should be obliged to adhere to the norms of JSY.
[Mother, Nayagarh]
Performance motivations of community health workers
(or ASHAs)
The CHWs, on an average spent five to six days in hos-
pitals when mothers required C-sections. Otherwise, they
spent 40 to 60 hours (60–80 hours in remote areas) for
each mother during the entire maternity period. Linking
remuneration with the conduct of each activity motivated
ASHAs on their designated duties. ASHAs were satisfied
on mothers’ attitude towards them. However, supply-side
constraints such as lack of transportation and non-timely
availability of JSY cards de-motivated their performance,
besides affecting community’s confidence on them. In
addition to their time, ASHAs also spent money on
mothers’ food and medicines limiting their actual in-
centive to US$ 2–4 instead of the earmarked US$
7.50. Despite this, ASHAs were proud of their moral
responsibilities on supporting mothers. In order to
serve the mothers better, they desired to receive moreon-the-job training, supportive supervision and systematic
capacity development.
I am forced to perform each activity, otherwise I will
not get the provisioned incentives. [ASHA, Gajapati]
How can we be heartless when we deal with pregnant
mothers, who are our own sisters from the village?
[ASHA Mayurbhanj]
I do spend from my purse on mother’s food and
medicines at hospitals, but I often get lesser than what
I spend. [ASHA, Nayagarh]
My knowledge and performance will be improved with
further training on work and capacity development
activities. I also need regular supervision and on-the-
job support. [ASHA, Mayurbhanj]
Need to link JSY with other financial risk -protection
measures
Women were largely concerned about OOPS on maternal
healthcare. Yet, they were happy to receive JSY incentive
as it reduced their financial burden to some extent. They
were more appreciative of the ‘direct’ financial incentives
under JSY than the ‘indirect’ financial risk- protection
measures offered by other alternative health financing
schemes. In one of the districts, the study had specifically
explored about the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana
(RSBY), a government scheme providing health insurance
coverage for the poor [21]. Those who received both
RSBY and JSY benefits were appreciative of their com-
bined role in reducing OOPS. Among the three options
such as free care, JSY alone, and a combination of JSY and
other measures (e.g. RSBY), women preferred the third
option. This preference was mainly due to their expe-
rience of incurring fresh OOPS through incentives such as
JSY. Further, they had also perceived that the free care
option too could induce OOPS of some kind.
I like to receive JSY benefits as it is an incentive for us,
if we deliver in a hospital. [Mother, Gajapati]
I want to have both JSY and any other scheme,
because JSY is a financial incentive and other
measures might help us to reduce instant spending
from our side. [Mother, Mayurbhanj]
I am not able to believe a situation of free care. We
every time have to spend on many things. People
say that government hospitals are meant for poor
people, but we never get absolutely free care.
[Mother, Gajapati]
ASHAs did not support integrating various incentive
schemes (e.g. RSBY and JSY) since they were skeptical
about the reporting and monitoring procedures. They
preferred separate activity-based incentives under both
schemes. MoH officials appreciated combining demand-
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brought in by demand-side boosters. However, they were
cynical on integrating JSY with other measures as it
might negate the gains achieved so far on institutionaliz-
ing childbirths. They wanted to enhance ASHA’s incen-
tives, but were against providing ASHAs a permanent
employment as it could reduce their performance mo-
tivation. They urged for enhancing mother’s financial
incentives to meet the additional expenses incur during
hospitalization.
I find it difficult to understand how the reporting and
monitoring will be if we integrate different incentive
schemes for mothers. [CHW, Mayurbhanj]
I prefer to have activity-based incentives under each
scheme than combining the incentives.
[CHW, Gajapati]
JSY could uptake institutional delivery; an integration
of different schemes might undermine the role of JSY.
[Medical Officer, Gajapati]
It is wise to increase the financial incentives of both
mothers and ASHAs. But, giving a permanent cadre to
ASHAs might reduce their performance motivations.
[Medical Officer, Nayagarh]
Discussion
Demand side financing through the JSY scheme could
enhance access to and utilization of maternal healthcare
services. JSY’s contribution was evident in increased
skilled birth attendance, ANC, PNC, and a partial finan-
cial risk-protection. The gains in institutionalization of
deliveries are far greater than those of ANC and PNC,
indicating the limited role of JSY in comprehensively
addressing the maternal care needs. This could be due
to the linking of entire incentives with in-facility delivery
or skilled birth attendance than individually for each
aspect of maternal care.
For a sustained improvement in maternal and child
health, a comprehensive maternal care integrating its mul-
tiple aspects (e.g. health education, nutrition, ANC and
PNC) will be required [22]. The non-encouraging trend of
maternal deaths compared to infant deaths also highlights
the relevance of post-partum care, as substantial share of
maternal deaths might occur around the post-partum
period [22,23]. Since DSF can motivate behavior change,
their initiation, design, roll-out and evaluation need to
be carefully planned to induce appropriate and rational
health-seeking behaviors [4].
Demand creation and supply strengthening
DSF is a way to translate healthcare needs into demand
for health services [5]. In the presence of adequeate
capacity, creation of additional demand can ensure effec-
tive service utilization [24].On the contrary, if there aresupply constraints, quality of care might be compromised
and further, providers and consumers may not be moti-
vated on rational behaviors [8]. There are examples from
Nepal demonstrating that private sector was excessively
utilized as the public system faced systemic limitations [8].
Under the JSY scheme, the synergy between the demand-
and supply-sides is enhanced through the intermedia-
ry or link-worker role of ASHAs. ASHAs also tried to
neutralize the supply constraints by externally purcha-
sing the supplies, which were unavailable at facilities
for mothers during childbirth. However, this is not a
sustainable solution as it might affect their perform-
ance motivation in the long run. Hence, supply-side
strengthening is a necessary precondition for any
demand-side incentive to produce desirable results.
Is demand side incentive an appropriate financial risk-
protection mechanism for maternal care?
A DSF scheme like JSY is not designed to pool financial
risks [24]. While inducing a specific behavior change, it
can trigger fresh OOPS and deepen household financial
crisis. The financial catastrophe arises when financial
access or risk-protection is not ensured otherwise for
those who are exposed to the first-time institutionalized
care and those who do not have adequate purchasing
power. It is worth noting that JSY-supported institu-
tional deliveries incurred more OOPS than domiciliary
child birth and non-JSY supported institutional deliver-
ies. If fresh OOPS fetch substantial health benefits and
are not deepening the financial crisis of the payer,
they might be justifiable. However, in this study, we
do not have evidence in this regard to justify the
presence of fresh OOPS.
The extent of OOPS largely depends on the design
of the incentives, conditionality, provider and consumer
accountability and service delivery status [25]. For
instance, the use of a designated health facility was a
JSY requirement. Though many non-designated faci-
lities were available nearby, women incurred conside-
rable OOPS to reach out to far off designated health
facilities. Further, mothers and ASHAs spent privately
on supplies due to systemic constraints. The consu-
mer accountability also mattered as without realizing
the real benefits of institutionalized childbirth, mothers
preferred it over home delivery. This preference was
owing to their realization that in-facility deliveries carried
more financial incentives than home-based skilled-birth
attendance.
Another concern was the lack of provider accounta-
bility leading to substantial OOPS in terms of informal
payments. One of the reasons behind this perverse
behavior could be lack of adequate incentives for them
[25]. Many Latin American and Turkish DSF initiatives
also had reported that adequate provider incentives were
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[25].Without proper provider behavior, it will be difficult
to inculcate necessary consumer awareness and a sense
of entitlement.
Financial incentives induce a particular behavioral change
and improve awareness on health seeking. Having gained
awareness, people’s compliance to the changed behavior is
likely to be higher for discrete healthcare choices, especially
for child birth (more of a household event) [6]. Therefore,
there would be fairly increased demand for skilled birth at-
tendance in future. However, it should be ensured that fi-
nancial incentives for behavior changes are not inducing
deeper OOPS and financial catastrophe. If women face sub-
stantial transport costs and informal payments, it may be
wise considering cost-effective and safe home-based deliv-
eries with skilled birth attendance [26,27]. The considerable
presence of home deliveries among the respondents justi-
fies this transportation constraints. Many home-based ma-
ternal care models exist and JSY can promote some of
them [27,28].
Harmonization of financial assistance measures
Many Latin American countries could demonstrat that fi-
nancial incentives can be full-fledged and substantial to
comprehensively cover various health aspects under a par-
ticular health goal (e.g. MDG 5) [28]. For JSY, it might be
essential to integrate with other financial risk-protection or
social assistance measures as Brazil and Nicaragua had
demonstrated [29,30]. For instance, integration with health
insurance might enable covering with careful planning the
hospital costs fairly and improve consumer choices and
provider accountability [25]. However, a federal structure
like India with multiple ministries handling social assistance
has to ensure a unified coordination [29]. A social assist-
ance approach may enable DSF to uphold more sense of
‘right to maternal healthcare’ than a mere tight and condi-
tional approach [31,32]. Currently, one Indian initiative
namely Muthulakshmi Reddy Scheme comprehensively
addresses ‘maternal care’ by incorporating nutritional
aspects. However, the provision of cash transfer after child-
birth makes this scheme unfit to track each outcome [33].A
provision of fixed sum or pumping money, rather than ob-
jective based transfer to women may not achieve the
expected results. This is certainly because of the house-
holds’ alternative needs, prioritization and gender power
structure [34,35].
Community health worker model for incentivized
maternal healthcare
India brings in an encouraging model on community
health workers as grass roots level change makers for
healthcare. The optimum level of compensation for such
a voluntary cadre is still debatable. We observed that
the volunteers with activity-based financial incentivesand service delivery improvements can enhance commu-
nity health awareness and service utilization. However,
maintaining optimum performance motivation for such
volunteers especially through adequate remuneration,
supervision, capacity development and monitoring is an
emerging need [36,37]. This requirement was evident in
a fewer cases where ASHAs demanded for remuneration
without real performances. As pointed out by the stake-
holders, their performance might be less-optimal, if given
a permanent cadre or being asked to perform non-
incentivized activities. A democratic revision of their
incentives may be worth maintaining their motivations.
While fixing up incentives, the time spent on processes
also needs to considered than the end activity alone.Strengths and limitations of the study
This was one of the unique attempts to look at the
financial risk-protection and financial access to health-
care under demand side financing. As applicable to the
qualitative research methods, our study might not have
wider implications beyond the study context. Though we
looked at the secular trend of maternal healthcare con-
sumption, the study design did not allow us to consider
the factors attributable to it other than JSY. There was
scope for recall bias while exploring the OOPs on child
birth without JSY benefits. However, considering the
universality of the program and its extent, the findings
add to the rare global evidence base on DSFs. The recom-
mendations might carry special value for the design and
implementation of DSFs in similar LMIC settings. We also
validated the healthcare costs and financial catastrophe on
maternal care from other sources in the study settings.Conclusion
The Indian version of the DSF incentive appears to have
enhanced financial access to and utilization of maternal
healthcare, particularly institutional deliveries. The pres-
ence of financial risk-protection in JSY-supported child-
birth was partial. It did not adequately link institutional
delivery with ANC and PNC. Similarly, the knowledge
transfer on maternal healthcare was limited and lopsided
due to which fresh out-of-pocket spending was triggered
by this incentive. An integration of JSY with similar social
or financial risk-protection measures is likely to provide
comprehensive financial risk- protection. Such an inte-
grated approach would also enable addressing maternal
health beyond ‘maternal healthcare,’ upholding awareness
on maternal health entitlements and ensuring sustainabi-
lity through pooled resources.Competing interests
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